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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON WAYS
AND MEANS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE
HEARING ON THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT OF THE
AMERICAS AND PROSPECTS FOR FREE TRADE IN THE
HEMISPHERE




Thank you for inviting me here today to present the views of the United
States Council for International Business on the importance of including in-
vestment protections in the agreement establishing the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA).
Trade and investment are interdependent. To achieve the benefits of eco-
nomic liberalization, investment barriers must be addressed as comprehen-
Mr. Price is a partner at Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy L.L.P. in Washington,
D.C. where he advises clients on international trade and investment matters. While Deputy
General Counsel in the Office of the U.S. trade Representative, he served as a negotiator of
Chapter 11 of NAFTA and numerous bilateral investment treaties. He was also U.S. deputy
Agent to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in The Hague. He received his B.A. from Haverford
College, a Diploma in Legal Studies from Cambridge University, and a J.D. from Harvard
Law School.
The United States Council for International Business is a trade association of some
300 companies active in the global marketplace. Founded in 1945, the Council is dedicated to
promoting an open system of world trade, investment, and finance. The Council advances the
global interests of American business both at home and abroad. It is the American affiliate of
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Business and Industry advisory Committee
(BIAC) to the OECD, and the International Organization of Employers (IOE). As such, it
officially represents U.S. business positions both in the main intergovernmental bodies and
vis-t-vis foreign business communities and their governments.
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sively as trade barriers. And the rules protecting U.S. investment abroad
must be both rigorous and enforceable.
Taken together, the expansion of trade and investment flows has spurred
economic growth, created jobs for millions of people in the United States and
abroad, raised global living standards, and has helped forge bonds of mutual
interest and economic opportunity among countries around the world.
International investment flows are rapidly becoming as important as trade
in goods and services. The world economy is no longer characterized by
companies that remain parked within national borders and that simply export
or sell locally. Companies are investing abroad in ever-increasing numbers.
They do so to get closer to their markets, acquire new technologies, form
strategic alliances and enhance competitiveness by integrating production
and distribution. The activities of their affiliates are impressive and make an
enormous contribution to economic welfare worldwide. According to the
United Nations World Investment Report 2000, sales by foreign affiliates of
corporations totaled fourteen trillion dollars in 1999, over four times the fig-
ure for 1980 and twice the value of global exports. Foreign affiliates ac-
counted for over three trillion dollars in exports in 1999. The production of
foreign affiliates now accounts for approximately ten percent of global GDP,
and foreign affiliates now employ over forty million people.
II. RESPONDING TO CRITICISMS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION
AND LIBERALIZATION
In spite of the economic significance of investment flows, some critics
have suggested that promoting stable investment regimes abroad will lead to
an export of American jobs. Some have also argued that investment liberali-
zation will lead to a "race to the bottom" with investment flowing principally
to countries with minimal or no protections for the environment or worker
rights. The facts do not support these claims.
A. International Investment Flows- Inbound and Outbound- Contribute to
the Economic Prosperity of the U.S.
The U.S. has been, perhaps, the greatest beneficiary of the explosion in
international investment over the past decade. The United States receives
more than 30% of worldwide investment. According to the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA), foreign investment in the U.S. grew seven-fold
between 1994 and 2000, reaching almost three hundred seventeen billion
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dollars last year. As of 1998, foreign companies had invested over three
point five trillion dollars in the U.S. They employed five point six million
people and paid average annual salaries of over forty-six thousand dollars,
well above the average salary for U.S. workers as a whole. U.S. subsidiaries
of non-U.S. companies accounted for thirteen point five percent of all U.S.
manufacturing jobs. In 1998, foreign companies' affiliates in the U.S. ac-
counted for approximately twenty-two percent of total U.S. exports. Inbound
investment is critical to the health of the U.S. economy.
Outbound investment is equally important. According to the BEA, be-
tween 1994 and 2000, U.S. outbound investment doubled from seventy-three
billion dollars to one hundred forty-eight billion dollars. As of 1998, the
assets of non-bank foreign affiliates of U.S. companies exceeded four trillion
dollars. In 1998, non-bank foreign affiliates of U.S. companies had over two
point four trillion dollars in sales- that is nearly two and one-half times the
amount of U.S. exports of goods and services. According to the Survey of
Current Business, exports by U.S. multinationals were four hundred thirty-
eight billion dollars in 1998, an amount equal to some two-thirds of all U.S.
exports. Approximately fifty percent of these exports were to the majority-
owned affiliates of those U.S. companies. Thus, agreements promoting sta-
ble investment regimes abroad do not export jobs, but rather lead to increased
exports of goods and services and contribute broadly to the economic well-
being of the U.S.
B. Investment Liberalization does not Lead to a Race to the Bottom.
If lax environmental standards, low wages and the absence of worker
rights were the principal determinants of investment flows, one would expect
the least developed countries to be the host of the vast majority of foreign
investment. Yet the reverse is true.
More than seventy-five percent of all foreign direct investment is in the
developed world. As noted, the U.S. itself is host to more than thirty percent
of all such investment. The United Kingdom runs a distant second with a
little more than one-fourth the total of the U.S. or eighty-two billion dollars
as of 1999. China, by contrast, received forty billion dollars in 1999, less
than five percent of global flows. Thus investment has, in fact, raced to the
top, flowing in overwhelming proportion to stable democracies that are char-
acterized by high living standards, well-developed regulatory regimes and
transparent legal systems.
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The wage statistics are equally telling. In 1998, the average compensa-
tion paid to workers at majority-owned U.S. affiliates throughout the world
was thirty-three thousand one hundred dollars. In Canada and Europe, which
receive two-thirds of all U.S. outbound investment, the average compensa-
tion at U.S. majority-owned affiliates was forty-one thousand two hundred
dollars. Investment has not "raced" to the lowest wage levels.
The critics confuse the cause and the cure: problems of environmental
protection and labor standards are preeminently problems of economic de-
velopment. Inadequate environmental standards and worker rights do not
attract, and are not the result of, increased investment flows; rather they are
in part the consequences of the absence of investment capital necessary to
alleviate poverty and raise living standards- the root cause of the problem.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF AN INVESTMENT CHAPTER IN THE
FI'AA
Our Latin Anerican and Caribbean partners in the FTAA have experi-
enced a dramatic surge in foreign investment over the past decade. The
enormous opportunities that have opened up in the region- in large part as a
result of massive privatization efforts- have made Latin American and Carib-
bean countries a primary destination for foreign investment among the de-
veloping countries around the world. The region now accounts for approxi-
mately ten percent of global FDI inflows. According to the United Nations,
FDI in the region grew almost twenty- three percent between 1998 and 1999
alone, and as of 1999 stood at ninety billion dollars.
While the U.S. is the largest investor in the region, it has not kept pace
with growth of investment opportunities there. According to the BEA, U.S.
companies invested seventeen point seven one billion dollars in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean in 1994. U.S. investment in the region in 2000 was
virtually the same, at approximately seventeen point eight billion dollars.
The U.S. is clearly not taking advantage of the investment boom in the re-
gion. In fact, most of the investment flows are between countries within the
region, as they have already begun the process of economic integration with-
out us. In addition, our major competitors, particularly from Europe, have
stepped in to fill the vacuum.
An FTAA that both opens borders to trade and provides strong invest-
ment protections would create enormous commercial opportunities for U.S.
industry and would unleash synergies in production and distribution opera-
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tions. Trade liberalization without investment liberalization will prevent
companies from achieving these synergies and rationalizing their supplier
networks. Conversely, investment liberalization without trade liberalization
will lead to the creation of duplicative production operations as producers are
forced to build manufacturing facilities behind the "tariff walls" protecting
each market. Investment protection and liberalization is thus a crucial part of
a free trade agreement.
In addition to these economic benefits, an investment chapter would pro-
mote broader U.S. policy goals. Investment agreements negotiated by the
U.S. essentially incorporate U.S. constitutional protections against the taking
of property without just compensation and against arbitrary or discriminatory
government actions. As they have done in the U.S., these principles foster
development of the rule of law, respect for private property and a market-
based free enterprise system that are essential hallmarks of a democratic so-
ciety.
Recognizing these important dynamics, some thirty leading U.S. compa-
nies and trade associations wrote to Ambassador Zoellick on April 19 affirm-
ing their support for inclusion of an investment chapter in the FTAA mod-
eled on the strong and comprehensive provisions found in NAFTA.
IV. THE NEED FOR STRONG LEGAL PROTECTION OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT: CORE ELEMENTS OF AN INVESTMENT CHAPTER
The explosive growth in cross-border investment is attributable to several
factors, not the least of which is the development of strong, stable legal re-
gimes to protect property rights. Over the past decade, we have witnessed a
sea change in the way countries- particularly developing countries- have
treated foreign investment. Whereas before they pursued economic growth
through state control of the private sector and import substitution policies,
they have come to realize that growth is best promoted through free trade and
liberal investment regimes. Countries in Latin America in particular have
undertaken vast privatization efforts and have revamped their legal systems
to attract foreign investment.
According to the United Nations, of one thousand thirty-five changes
worldwide in laws governing foreign direct investment between 1991 and
1999, ninety-four percent were more favorable to foreign investment. The
number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) has risen from one hundred
eighty-one at the end of 1980 to one thousand eight hundred fifty-six at the
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end of 1999. Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have signed
approximately three hundred BITs, virtually all of which were negotiated in
the 1980s and 1990s. As of December 31, 1996, the countries of Latin
American and the Caribbean had negotiated thirty-seven BITs among them-
selves all in the 1990s. It is no coincidence that these changes to the legal
landscape have occurred at the same time as cross-border investment has
expanded over the past decade.
It should be noted, however, that the U.S. has signed investment agree-
ments with only three of the top ten Latin American recipient countries of
foreign investment. The FTAA would include six of the remaining seven
markets.
Including an investment chapter in the FTAA would help lock in these
advances in creating a regulatory environment hospitable to international
investment. While strong investment laws are not themselves sufficient to
attract foreign investment, they are a necessary prerequisite for such invest-
ment. A recent study by economists at the Inter- American Development
Bank found that strong investment laws, particularly laws protecting foreign
investors from expropriation and preserving contract rights, play central roles
in attracting FDI. It also found that free trade agreements significantly in-
crease investment among the members of the free trade area.
In order to establish a strong investment regime throughout the Hemi-
sphere, the FTAA should include all of the fundamental protections that have
been codified in U.S. bilateral investment treaties and in Chapter 11 of the
NAFTA. The U.S. has sought the inclusion of these principal protections in
bilateral and multilateral investment agreements since World War II when it
began negotiating a series of modem treaties of friendship, commerce and
navigation (FCN). The investor-state dispute settlement mechanism was
included in the first U.S. bilateral investment treaty (on which all subsequent
U.S. BITs have been based) in 1980.
What are these fundamental protections?
First, the investment chapter should guarantee foreign investors the better
of national treatment or MFN treatment, both with respect to the establish-
ment of investments and treatment thereafter. This will ensure nondiscrimi-
natory treatment and the removal of barriers to entry.
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Second, the FTAA should protect investors against expropriation without
payment of compensations. This protection should extend both to direct ex-
propriation- for example, the physical taking or nationalization of property-
and to indirect expropriation such as may occur through regulation or other
forms of so-called creeping expropriation. The inclusion of indirect expro-
priation is crucial. Government action may impair or destroy the value of an
investment even if there is no physical seizure or destruction of the property.
Third, the investment chapter should guarantee investment fair and equi-
table treatment, full protection and security, and protection in accordance
with international law. These provisions have long been included by the U.S.
in bilateral and multilateral investment instruments. The fair and equitable
treatment standard, in particular, protects against lawless, arbitrary, unrea-
sonable, bad faith or other justifiable government actions. These protections
help promote the rule of law and are meant to safeguard the interests of U.S.
investors where government action or inaction, while not rising to the level
of expropriation per se or outright discrimination on nationality grounds,
nonetheless subjects the investor to adverse and injurious treatment.
Fourth, the investment chapter should guarantee the free movement of
capital associated with the investment, including the repatriation of profits.
Without this protection, investors will not commit the resources necessary to
undertake large-scale investments.
Fifth, the investment chapter should prohibit performance requirements
such as local content and export requirements, and other trade- related in-
vestment measures. Such measures distort trade flows and create economic
inefficiencies, thereby offsetting the benefits of the agreement.
Finally, the investment chapter should include a mechanism to allow in-
vestors to arbitrate investment disputes with host governments and obtain
monetary compensation for damages resulting from violations of the agree-
ment. Access to an arbitration procedure of this sort is the only effective way
to guarantee enforcement and obtain appropriate redress. Limiting invest-
ment dispute settlement to a state-to-state procedure will politicize disputes,
leaving investors, particularly small-and medium-sized enterprises, with little
recourse save what their government cares to give them after weighing the
diplomatic pros and cons of bringing any particular claim. Furthermore, a
state-to-state dispute settlement procedure based on the WTO model, which
provides only prospective relief, will not remedy most violations of the
agreement. If, for example, a government expropriates an investor's prop-
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erty, prospective relief without providing compensation to the investor will
not redress the injury done to the investor.
V. RESPONDING TO CRITICISM OF NAFTA's INVESTOR-STATE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM
The investor-state dispute settlement mechanism has been perhaps the
most controversial aspect of the investment chapter of the NAFTA. Critics
have alleged that it undermines a nation's sovereign right to regulate. The
evidence simply does not support these claims.
At the outset, two facts should be recognized. First, under NAFTA an
investor- state arbitral tribunal can only award the payment of compensatory
money damages to an injured investor; tribunals have no authority to order a
party to change its laws. Second, it is U.S. investors that have more capital at
risk than investors from any other country, and thus have the most to gain
from an effective mechanism for enforcing investor protections.
In any case, there is no evidence that arbitration tribunals will jeopardize
public welfare to uphold the economic interests of foreign investors. A care-
ful examination of the NAFTA arbitration decisions to date reveals that the
tribunals have acted with great care. In two cases where an arbitration tribu-
nal ruled in favor of a U.S. foreign investor- SD Myers and Metalclad- the
tribunal found that the government authorities were acting arbitrarily or tar-
geting a specific foreign investor with unfair or discriminatory measures. It
should be noted that Mexico brought suit in a Canadian court to set aside the
Metalaclad award, and the court recently upheld the tribunal's decision that
the U.S. investor's property had been expropriated. In two other cases- Az-
inian and Waste Management- the U.S. investor lost outright, one on the
merits, the other on jurisdiction.
In the recently released decision in Pope & Talbot, the tribunal rejected
all but one of the U.S. investor's claims. The one claim that was upheld was
based on a finding that the Canadian authorities had acted unfairly in impos-
ing extremely burdensome, and arguably illegal, administrative requirements
on the investor. While the tribunal was careful to avoid questioning the mo-
tives of the Canadian Government in that case, it appeared from the facts that
the Government's actions were motivated by a desire to punish the investor
for bringing the NAFTA claim.
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In Ethyl- which is often cited by critics as an example of a case where a
foreign investor forced a government to withdraw a bona fide environmental
measure- Canada settled a NAFTA case brought by a U.S. investor. How-
ever, the settlement was spurred by a holding by a Canadian panel, not the
NAFTA arbitration tribunal, that the particular measures imposed by Canada
violated an internal Canadian arrangement called the Agreement on Internal
Trade.
This track record hardly demonstrates that arbitration tribunals have over-
stepped their bounds in protecting the rights of investors. To the contrary,
the evidence to date shows that tribunals have taken a reasonable, balanced
and judicious approach in interpreting and applying the NAFTA investment
provisions.
Nevertheless, critics of the NAFTA investment chapter point to cases
against the U.S. that have not yet been decided- such as the Methanex or
Loewen cases- and have speculated about how tribunals in those cases might
rule. Indeed, those critics find troubling the very initiation of these claims. I
do not express a view on the merits of these pending cases. However, the
mere fact that cases have been brought against the U.S. in no way under-
mines the legitimacy or integrity of the dispute settlement process. Indeed
even frivolous cases may be brought before a NAFTA panel just as they are
brought in the U.S. courts every day, but this does not mean that either the
court system or the arbitration mechanism is flawed. If claims are found to
be frivolous, then they will be rejected. If claims are justified, then the re-
spondent, including the U.S. as the case may be, should pay compensation.
This is the price of living in an international system governed by the rule of
law.
The U.S. has long been the champion of international investment rules. It
has fought hard for recognition of the international rule of law and for respect
for international dispute resolution bodies. The U.S. has enjoyed enormous
benefits from invoking dispute settlement provisions to break down trade
barriers or redress injuries to investors. Indeed, of the approximately thirty
claims under BITs that have come before the International Center for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (ICSID), about one-third have been brought by
U.S. investors. And of the sixteen claims that have been brought under
NAFTA's investment provisions, eleven have been brought by U.S. inves-
tors. It would be ironic if the U.S., long the advocate for subjecting sover-
eign actions to scrutiny under international law, were now to retreat from the
very international principles it worked so hard to enshrine.
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Concerns about investor-state arbitration- and agitation over its compati-
bility with sovereignty- are without foundation. Fears about overreaching
arbitral panels are likewise unfounded given the record of decisions.
None of this should be taken to imply that the system could not be im-
proved. The process would benefit from two important changes. First, the
FTAA parties should consider increasing the transparency of the process by
ensuring that the briefs and arbitration proceedings are open to public view,
subject to reasonable protections for confidential business information. An
amicus, or "friend of the court," procedure might also be developed where by
interested members of the public could express their views on the issues be-
fore the tribunals.
Second, the parties to the FTAA might consider the desirability of creat-
ing an appellate body that would review arbitral awards for errors of law.
Such an appellate mechanism would accomplish three salutary goals: (1) it
would address the risk of an aberrant or wildly erroneous decision that seems
to have captured the imagination of critics; (2) it would contribute to the de-
velopment of a coherent body of jurisprudence on the interpretation of the
FTAA; and (3) it would eliminate the possibility of having the court systems
in each of the thirty-four FTAA parties become involved in the review of
FTAA awards and hence the interpretation of FTAA, a possibility left open
by NAFTA.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Hemisphere stands at the threshold of comprehensive free trade
agreement talks in which investment rules should figure prominently. Inves-
tor-state dispute settlement will be essential to ensuring the effectiveness of
those rules. Now is not the time to depart from longstanding U.S. investment
policy and time-tested methods for the resolution of investment disputes.
As the largest economy in the region, the U.S. has the most at stake in the
hemispheric integration. By leading the negotiation of an agreement that
removes trade and investment barriers and promotes democratic values, the
U.S. can secure for itself and its neighbors the benefits of economic growth
and prosperity. An investment chapter is an essential component of any
agreement seeking to achieve these goals.
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